MANAMA: Parliamentary elections in Iraq are unlikely to offer any meaningful change to the country’s security or business environment, according to an expert.
“The re-election of Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, without meaningful concessions to Sunni leaders and tribes, would likely strengthen the anti-government insurgency in al-Anbar province and more broadly encourage more Sunnis to facilitate armed attacks on the government,” Zaineb Al-Assam, Senior Analyst, IHS Country Risk, in a report said.
“The limitations of Iraq’s security forces to combat an expanding insurgency and the subsequent re-mobilisation of Shia militias present a severe risk of a resumption of Sunni-Shia civil war in mixed towns in central and northern Iraq in the event of Maliki’s re-election.”
“Outside of Baghdad, there is likely to be an increase in sectarian violence in Sunni-Shia disputed areas between al-Anbar and Karbala, and in Diyala, Salahuddin, and Babil. Arab-Kurd violence is also likely in disputed cities such as Khanaqin, near the border with the Kurdistan region.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s supporters and opponents alike have presented the election as a referendum on his leadership. The 2014 poll is likely to be more sectarian than the vote in 2010, with most of the lists attracting exclusively Sunni or Shia votes.
Furthermore Iraq’s electoral system makes it very unlikely that a single coalition will achieve 165 of the 328 seats in the Council of Representatives required for a ruling majority. Instead Maliki will have to enter into alliances with other parties to gain the seats required to form the next government.
As the 2010 elections showed, it is this process that matters. Maliki’s State of Law Coalition had received fewer seats than his opponents in the secular Iraqiyya bloc (89 to 91). However, Maliki was able to gain the support of the main Shia parliamentary bloc, the National Iraqi Alliance, which allowed him to form the next government.
Although Maliki has attempted to paint the insurgency as almost exclusively perpetrated by foreign (particularly Saudi) and Baathist Al-Qaeda militants, Sunni discontent with the government’s perceived sectarian policies is the underlying driver of insurgent violence.
These areas of discontent include: the overwhelming number of security operations being focused on Sunni areas; arrests and raids targeting Sunni leaders, including former vice president Tareq al-Hashemi and former finance minister Rafi al-Issawi; the suppression of anti-government protests in al-Anbar province; and the government’s suspension of financial support to the Sunni tribal Awakening Movements (Sahwa) following the US withdrawal from Iraq.
Currently, the Iraqi army lacks the numbers and weapons to prevent Sunni insurgent groups such as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) from proliferating. Without broad tribal support, the government has little prospect of eradicating insurgent groups, including ISIL, from al-Anbar province. Shia militias such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hizbullah, which have benefited from training they received while fighting for the Assad government in Syria, will therefore be increasingly relied upon.