Manama: Mahmood Rafique, Editor: The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continue to pose a threat to the Middle East peace and security.
“The IRGC values its international influence network even more than it does the state’s ballistic missile and nuclear programmes, the odds of reaching a satisfactory follow-on agreement to the JCPOA that usefully constrains Iran are limited,” Dr John Chipman told the delegates at the opening of the 17th IISS Manama Dialogue 2021.
In any case, Dr Chipman said, there are well-grounded concerns about the acceleration of its centrifuge-production programme. “The new government in Tehran no doubt needs sanctions to be lifted but is unlikely to agree to a measurable reduction of its regional influence operations – even if that could be defined in a negotiated text – to achieve that. How deterrence and defence postures can shape strategic perceptions in Iran, is a subject that will naturally be central to our reflections this weekend,” he said.
In the Middle East, there is perhaps less sign of intervention fatigue from Iran, whose well-maintained international influence networks remain capable of affecting political outcomes in several countries in which they operate.
Generally, he added, intervention fatigue does not automatically lead to conflict termination, and de-escalation does not naturally slide into détente. “Apparently settled security alignments are shifting as countries hedge their strategic positions.
“Hence the second trend of multiplied minilateralism. Alliance and partnership structures are changing to accommodate the shifting environment. More countries are engaging in what might be styled ‘strategic self-determination’, setting out their own particular security priorities with greater precision, and making their own ad hoc, often informal, strategic arrangements. This is true from Europe to the Indo-Pacific.
“As large security institutions become difficult to manage, and strategic autonomy proves hard to achieve, inevitably smaller coalitions of the willing, special purpose strategic vehicles, and minilateral arrangements of all kinds, begin to multiply. From the nuclear propulsion sharing agreement between Australia, the UK and the US, known as AUKUS, to new alignments in the Eastern Mediterranean, changing relationships in the Red Sea region, and the reinforcement of various ‘Quad’ arrangements by India, both ‘East’ and ‘West’, this minilateral trend is clear. The IISS Manama Dialogue needs to take stock of how this fast-paced diplomacy is helping to stabilise regions, or conversely, adding to uncertainty.
“Third, is the growing stature of the Indo-Pacific in the hierarchy of global priorities. The US, UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the EU have all identified Indo-Pacific tilts, strategies or guidelines in their national policies. NATO has pointed out that China is now present and active in Europe’s strategic space. In the Gulf region, engagement with China, Japan, ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific generally has grown. Economic and political links are strengthening. Equally, it is widely acknowledged in both the Middle East and Asia that these two regions are strategically co-dependent. Instability in the Middle East, can easily be exported to, and indeed imported by, Asian societies and states. For that reason, we at the IISS have wanted to ensure that there is useful cross-pollination between our two major security summits – the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, and the IISS Manama Dialogue in Bahrain.”
