MANAMA: Mahmood Rafique, Editor: The Houthi arsenal is continuing to increase and that Red Sea trade flows are down, despite Western pressure and its military response.
A new IISS report “Navigating Troubled Waters: The Houthis’ Campaign in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden” shows that, despite ongoing international military operations (Operation Prosperity Guardian, Operation Poseidon Archer and EUNAVFOR Aspides) joint military efforts have not succeeded in significantly reducing the overall number of Houthi attacks, while strikes from the international community have only temporarily degraded their capabilities.
“Navigating Troubled Waters: The Houthis’ Campaign in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden” also examines the evolution of Houthi strategy at sea over the twelve months since the start of the campaign, in particular with regard to targeting criteria, geographic scope and weapons systems used.
With many merchant ships transiting through the Red Sea, the report also looks at the economic impact of the crisis as well as the impact on global supply lines, which is found to have had more limited consequences than was first anticipated.
In a change of approach from October 2023, in the wake of the Hamas-led attacks on Israel, the Houthis began launching missile attacks and uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) against various targets in Israel – in addition to their role as a conflict party in Yemen’s internationalized civil war.
Neither attacks under Operations Poseidon Archer nor the Israeli Air Force have seriously impacted on their capabilities to either launch attacks or to smuggle weapons from Iran and other countries. This is a result of both the lack of ground forces within the international missions but also because of Yemen’s rugged geography that gives tactical advantages to the Houthis in concealing their positions.
Although civilian lives at sea have been saved, the defensive actions of Operation Prosperity Guardian and EUNAVFOR Aspides, have failed to sufficiently reassure the international shipping industry to return to the Red Sea in the numbers seen before November 2023. As a result, the participating nations need to maintain significant naval assets in the region.
This, however, comes as a serious burden particularly for the EU and its member states whose navies are already overstretched. In addition, the high cost of depleting expensive weapons systems to defend against the cheaply manufactured Houthi missiles and UAVs raises the question of how long the current mission can be sustained.
The Houthis’ arsenal consists primarily of Iranian-designed ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as locally manufactured UAVs and uninhabited surface vessels, while they continue to improve range and accuracy.
Despite a United Nations Security Council arms embargo since 2015, the group manages to smuggle weapons and their components into Yemen, where Houthi control of the Red Sea ports of Hudaydah and Salif remains important as does maritime smuggling using traditional dhows.
Moreover, the Houthis have been able to improve their reputation in the region. They have positioned themselves as the de facto government of much of Yemen and have also strengthened their position within the network of Iran’s allies. However, it remains to be seen how this might change and whether Tehran will be able to maintain its significant degree of influence in Yemen. The Houthis have also demonstrated their ambition to conduct their own foreign policy beyond the region through diplomatic contacts with Russia and China, which hints at the possibility of a more independent – but hardly more pro-Western – position in the future.
The impact in global supply lines has been more limited than first anticipated. In the last twelve months, since November 2023, the number of transits of merchant ships through the Red Sea has decreased by roughly 50%.
Many of the larger Western shipping lines have decided to divert their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, which had only a marginal impact in global supply lines and inflationary pressure. Red Sea countries, such as Egypt, rely heavily on the revenue from Suez transits and have felt the effects. Ports in Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Sudan have also been hit, yet most states in the region have remained passive about the crisis.
